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Only two decades ago, there was consensus in the international development lit-
erature that Sri Lanka stood out a paragon of social development and pluralist democ-
racy. Today, its economy is in trouble. It lurches from crisis to crisis; the war continues,
there is widespread disillusionment with political leadership (of whatever party), and
few can ever have lasting faith in the intentions of government. There is a general feel-
ing that the rapid growth and prosperity that should have followed economic reform has
been systematically undermined by a lethal combination of bad governance and effects
of the ethnic conflict -- in a sense, that the country got the economics right but fell short
on the politics.  Social and political developments are treated as exogenous variables in
the reform equation, unrelated to the monumental changes that have taken place in
economic policy.
It is our contention that this view is wrong, and that it is a serious misrepresen-
tation of the Sri Lanka problem. We will argue that, regardless of what the World Bank
and the IMF may have us believe, in practice, no liberalisation package is just eco-
nomic. It invariably combines both economic and political elements. It is country-
specific, embodying and shaped by institutions and political culture, and it is the polit-
ico-economic character of the particular package that determines the post-reform tra-
jectory. We believe, therefore, that what has been happening in Sri Lanka has to be
seen as the outcome of inter-linked economic and political policies, implemented in a
distinct but dynamically-evolving historical-institutional setting. Liberalisation has to
be interpreted, not just as a turning point in economic policy, but as part of a much
broader picture, giving momentum to the profound and disturbing transformation that
has occurred in the social and political life of the country.
At the same time, however, it is important to recognise that pre-reform Sri
Lanka was never quite the haven of peace, democracy and equality that has been de-
picted. The roots of post-reform problems are to be found in what happened earlier -- in
pre-existing, historically-evolved socio-political and institutional structures. There have
been clear continuities. It is essential, therefore, to look at the 1977 policy changes in a
wider context in order to be able to appreciate how the past shaped the future. When the
UNP came to power in 1977, the Sri Lankan economy had reached an impasse and
fundamental changes in policy were clearly imperative. Economic stagnation was gen-
erating socio-political instability, democratic institutions were being undermined by2
authoritarian leanings of the government, and a proliferation of government regulations
and extensive state intervention in all areas of economic life stimulated rent-seeking
and corruption.
So many of these problems are not new. When it came, specific features of the
liberalisation programme (and the manner of its implementation) reflected and inter-
acted with pre-reform structures of socio-political relations and networks of patronage.
In particular, they fed (and heightened) pre-existing ethnic and class tensions. The lib-
eralisation process neither reduced nor eliminated rent extraction: on the contrary, it
expanded the opportunities that existed on a quite unprecedented scale. Politicians,
state bureaucrats and a new group, the military and police hierarchy, found a fertile
ground for large-scale self-enrichment through the control of state power. However,
since these opportunities were threatened by existing political freedoms, potential pub-
lic scrutiny, and normal democratic processes, incentives to undermine legal and politi-
cal freedoms and institutions grew. Once locked into this path, those in control of the
state ensured that the economic reforms were designed and implemented in such a way
that the benefits continued. A mutually reinforcing process of economic ‘reforms’ and
socio-political decay was thus set in motion.
But Sri Lanka is not unique in this. It is noteworthy that, for all its distinctive
features, there are remarkable similarities between Sri Lankan experience and that of
many other countries that have implemented liberalisation policy reforms over the
course of the last decade. The experience of economic crisis, social and ethnic conflict
and political disintegration in many Central and Eastern European countries echoes a
similar story, and the relevance to other South Asian countries is obvious. This pro-
vides analysis with an important sense of perspective.
The structure of the argument is the following. We begin by presenting our view
that the point of entry is critical in understanding what is happening -- that you have to
consider the actual Sri Lankan policy package (that was both economic and political),
not just an economic package (along the lines of neo-liberal orthodoxy). We then try to
conceptualise likely links between the economics and politics based on recent theoreti-
cal developments and the experiences of other countries. After that, the discussion
reverts back to Sri Lanka, re-appraising what happened and exploring in more detail the3
inter-linkages between liberalisation and socio-political decay. The discussion is the
rounded off with some brief concluding remarks.
1
2. THE SRI LANKAN POLICY PACKAGE
Looking back at the literature, Sri Lankan liberalisation policy in the late 1970s
can be seen to have been defined very narrowly. True, it separated trade and exchange
rate liberalisation (true-blue economic policy) from the public sector investment pro-
gramme (the Mahaweli in particular). The latter was seen as a long-term investment in
basic infrastructure (not a liberalisation measure) and, despite its undoubted and very
profound effects on the national economy, as an 'extra-mural' activity. The economic
reform programme was carefully and systematically circumscribed as a well-defined
economic policy package that would produce long-term growth and prosperity. Parallel
evidence of a growing centralisation of political power, constitutional changes and
mounting repression of opposition and dissent (if they were mentioned at all) were
waived away as exogenous and as quite separate developments.
But does all this make sense? We believe it was a serious misrepresentation of
what was happening because in practice the policy package was not confined to eco-
nomic reforms (let alone neo-liberal measures) and because a narrow, purely 'economic'
analysis of this kind distracts attention from any meaningful consideration of political
alternatives. The Sri Lankan policy package has to be understood as a whole. It has to
be viewed not just as a jumble of separate and relatively independent policy initiatives,
but as a UNP programme -- driven by economic, political and ideological imperatives
that aimed to revamp the country's economic and political landscape. Though these
initiatives developed and evolved in response to economic and political opportunities as
and when they arose, separate elements of the package reflected an underlying unity of
purpose. The overall objective was to reorient the economy -- to alter patterns of re-
source allocation and benefits, to ensure and entrench the party's political domination
and settle many 'old debts' in the process. All this is equally true of the Premadasa re-
gime and that of the Peoples' Alliance. We will look at each in turn.
                                                
1 Many of the arguments in this essay are elaborated in greater detail in "Economic Liberalisation and
Socio-Political Decay: a case study of Sri Lanka", paper presented to the Development Studies Associa-
tion Annual Conference at the University of Manchester, 10-12 September 2001.4
2.1 The Jayewardena government
The strategy and policy package of the Jayewardena government clearly con-
tained dimensions that were both economic and political. There were three main strands
to its economic policy (trade and exchange rate reforms, the public sector investment
programme (PSIP) and cuts in food subsidies) and there was a series of clearly related
and less obviously related political elements (the latter concerned more with distribu-
tional issues, political control and the centralisation of power). None can be fully un-
derstood separately or from a purely economic or a solely political perspective.
For example, from the start of trade and macroeconomic policy reforms in the
late 1970s, implementation of the reform agenda was essentially discriminatory -- albeit
also complex because ethnic and class dimensions were interwoven. The criteria on
which trade liberalisation was shaped were in practice highly political. As Cuthbertson
and Athukorala (1990:408) pointed out "…the greatest policy failure was not to apply a
policy of gradual (even very gradual) overall reductions to this new set of tariff-only
barriers. Instead, the government fine-tuned the tariffs on a discriminatory basis. It
would have been much better to have taken further across-the-board measures. This
was apparently judged to be politically impossible". They maintained that "much of the
fine tuning…was aimed at saving the monopoly position of certain public corporations,
for example, tires, chemicals, paper, and pharmaceuticals" (p. 364). Imports of grapes,
chillies and onions grown in the Jaffna peninsular by Tamil farmers were liberalised,
while paddy and potatoes grown predominantly by Sinhalese farmers remained pro-
tected.
2 Favored state enterprises (that provided 'jobs for the boys') were also kept out-
side the liberalisation effort, running bloated wage bills and attracting large fiscal trans-
fers.
The PSIP was largely driven by political imperatives and it was equally dis-
criminatory. The Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project (AMDP) in particular
was projected by the government as a visible symbol of progress that touched deep-
seated nationalist and religious sentiments among the Sinhala-Buddhist community. It
had a twofold effect in that the benefits accrued primarily to the Sinhalese and that the
new settlement was seen by Tamils as continued encroachment on land that had been
                                                
2 Of course, not all Tamils suffered. In the wake of the previous shortages, the immediate benefits of
import liberalisation were widespread, and the urban middle class and those who controlled trade (in-
cluding wealthy Tamil commercial interests) gained quite disproportionately.5
traditionally theirs. More generally, the PSIP generated short-term employment and
provided sources of patronage. It promised large-scale employment for youth, land for
the rural poor and the prospect of lucrative government contracts for the government's
business supporters (mitigating some of the adverse impact of liberalisation on import
competing industries). As a result, rather perversely, the state sector experienced a
significant growth during the early period of the  'liberalisation' programme.
The third element of the economic policy -- the changes in welfare expenditure
-- had no pressing economic rationale. There was no obvious development rationale: no
rigorous study had (or has) ever demonstrated that Sri Lanka's poor pre-1977 growth
performance was due in any significant measure to its food subsidies, or that protec-
tionist trade policies were a necessary consequence of food subsidies. Nor was there
any immediate fiscal rationale: the budget deficit was expanding but, with large inflows
of external funds, fiscal austerity could in no sense be said to have been driving policy.
The primary motivation for the cuts was ideological and political. Jayawardene (who
had made the abortive attempt to cut food subsidies in 1953) had long been an oppo-
nent of subsidies. For him, their continuation symbolised the unwarranted political
power of the left and the unions. He now saw a political opportunity that had eluded
him for a quarter of a century -- not just to cut consumer subsidies but, perhaps more
importantly, to confront and crush the trade unions. Cutting ‘welfare’ expenditures thus
became a key component of the government agenda. By raising food prices, they also
bolstered support within the farming community and the brunt of the burden of subsidy
cuts fell on urban workers who had traditionally supported the left.
Once he had acted, it was almost inevitable that the cuts would provoke a con-
frontation with the unions, and indeed it seems very likely that this was a conscious part
of his political strategy.
3 In July 1980, public sector employees (who were strongly
unionised) tried to resist cuts in their living standards through strike action, and this
was to prove a watershed in the political life of the country. Jayawardene
                                                
3 The government’s political agenda was also of course part of the wider ideological-political imperatives
that drove cuts in the food subsidy. Washington institutions, particularly the World Bank, had long
pushed for removal of consumer subsidies and its motives can only be understood in the broader context
of its global policy agenda.6
considered trade unions a tool of the political left, and he had been preparing for battle.
In 1978, he had threatened public sector employees with dismissal if they participated
in a one-day token strike called by the left wing unions. In 1979, he had passed an Es-
sential Public Service Act that gave sweeping powers to the government to outlaw trade
union activities in the state sector (de Silva & Wriggins 1994). And now the govern-
ment was completely intransigent: it refused to negotiate, ordered workers to return to
work, and summarily dismissed thousands who defied the order. Political opposition to
these measures was brutally repressed. Troops were called out, strike-breakers from the
pro-government trade union -- the Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya (JSS) -- used strong-arm
tactics against strikers. Unions were also banned from the new export processing zones.
With the collapse of the 1980 strike, trade union activity that had characterised Sri
Lankan political life since the 1930s was muzzled and seriously weakened, closing off
what had hitherto been an important avenue of legal protest.
However, this deep-rooted hostility towards the trade unions was only one part
of a broader pattern of increasing political centralisation and authoritarianism. It was
reflected, for example, in the replacement of the Westminster-style parliamentary sys-
tem with a new, Gaullist-type constitution led by an executive presidency. It involved
minimum accountability to parliament, steady erosion of civil and electoral rights,
high-handed treatment of ethnic minorities, a refusal to hold parliamentary elections
and the subsequent extension of parliament through a referendum. Moreover, powerful
centralised political control and the impression that the government was omnipotent
were not just a reflection of the undoubted weakness of the opposition, of Jayawar-
dene's shrewdness and of his political persona (Moore 1990). They were interwoven
with the economic policies that were being implemented. He was firmly committed to
reversing what, for him, had been fifty wasted years of welfarism and left liberal poli-
cies, and committed to reshaping political institutions to ensure that the economic poli-
cies he was implementing could not be challenged or derailed. He was determined to
build a system of political loyalty and centralised power that would make his vision a
reality.
The combination of selective liberalisation, the PSIP and growing authoritari-
anism also provided a particularly favourable environment for corruption to flourish.
The rewards of being in office were greater than ever before, while being in opposition
was an experience of abject humiliation and powerlessness. The AMDP and the other7
'lead' projects offered almost unlimited scope for patronage and for financial gain via
the various contracts and commissions they generated. Politically-favoured state enter-
prises also continued to enjoy substantial fiscal transfers. For example, annual subsidies
to the national airline, Air Lanka (where Jayawardene's son was prominent) were larger
than those to domestic public transport, and sometimes exceeded the total expenditure
on food subsidies.
Initially, however, corruption did not surface as a major political issue. Rapid
growth of the economy produced high expectations and the public was willing to toler-
ate some degree of corruption as part of the price for success after so many years of
shortages and economic stagnation. But, once the initial surge of growth had begun to
moderate, dissatisfaction with the regime began to mount. As early as 1982, consider-
able popular dissatisfaction was already in evidence. There were widespread allegations
of vote-rigging in the presidential elections that saw the re-election of Jayawardene. His
refusal to hold parliamentary elections (due in mid-1982) and his decision to extend of
the life of parliament (where the UNP enjoyed a two thirds majority) through a referen-
dum was, as Manor (1984:1) put it, "the most dramatic change in political practice in
Sri Lanka since Independence". The referendum itself was marked by contempt for the
law, detention of opposition leaders, widespread thuggery and intimidation and consid-
erable vote rigging (Samarakone 1984).
There was, as a result, a growing perception among all layers of the population
that normal legal and parliamentary forms of political protest and change were being
systematically closed off. And it coincided with an economic slowdown and percep-
tions of heightening inequality and alienation among important segments of the popu-
lation. The implementation of the PSIP had a negative impact on the establishment of
labour-intensive export-oriented industries that might otherwise have expanded faster
in response to liberalisation measures. Selective trade liberalisation and the political
patronage associated with PSIP significantly increased the sense of marginalisation
among Tamils. Cuts in consumer subsidies and the emergence of a 'new rich' enhanced
perceptions among the low-income youth that the development strategy of the govern-
ment was pro-rich and anti-poor. There were ample grounds for widespread disillu-
sionment.
With old avenues for expressions of dissent and protest shut off, support for ex-
tra-parliamentary forms of struggle widened, particularly among Tamil and Sinhalese8
youth who felt themselves excluded from the ‘new economy’. Among Tamil youth --
the secessionist movement, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) -- began to
gather force. Among the Sinhalese, the JVP was revitalised and gained support, par-
ticularly in rural areas. When there were widespread anti-Tamil pogroms in 1983 –
allegedly with the complicity of a minister and some sections of the military – the ini-
tial response of the government was heavy-handed and unsympathetic, paving the way
for a major shift in Tamil attitudes towards separatist movements and an escalation of
the conflict. And as the regime became increasingly mired in a drawn out military con-
flict in the north and east, the pace of economic reforms slackened as did economic
growth. The nature of the emerging regime became more visible. It was deeply un-
popular and, according to Moore, it was kept in power by a military-cum-political in-
telligence apparatus and by arming its cadres (Moore 1990:345) -- the latter a trend that
was to be perpetuated. The authoritarian character of the regime was increasingly re-
sented, in turn requiring a firmer hand to retain control. Popular dissatisfaction grew in
the rest of the country and produced the conditions for the second JVP insurrection that
paralysed much economic activity in many parts of the country in the late 1980s.
2.2 The Premadasa Presidency
After the elections in 1989, the in-coming president, Premadasa, was faced not
only with the political challenge of dealing with the insurrection but with a major eco-
nomic crisis. His response was firm and effective, establishing a virtual dictatorship and
ruthlessly crushing the second JVP up-rising. An agreement was negotiated with the
IMF, a second wave of liberalisation reforms was implemented and, for the first time,
privatisation became a major item on the government's policy agenda. The economy
recovered strongly with the re-establishment of political stability. Liberalisation en-
hanced the incentives for export-oriented production, foreign investment started to flow
in, export industries (particularly the textile and garments sector) expanded rapidly, and
a general sense of optimism emerged within the business community, both foreign and
domestic. 
In effect, the Sri Lankan economic and political regime came to resemble that of
Suharto in Indonesia. Power and decision-making were centralised, dictatorial practices
of the President became increasingly blatant, corruption was institutionalised (and al-
legedly streamlined within the presidential office), but there was also policy clarity and9
stability. Business became increasingly confident that there would be no labour prob-
lems or other forms of disruption to economic activity. Many (including some left-
leaning academics) saw the government as corrupt and dictatorial but efficient and
good for economic growth. Sri Lanka seemed to have embraced the authoritarian
growth-state model of the then vibrant East Asian 'tiger' economies, and there was con-
siderable speculation that it was at last on the way to emulating the East Asian NICs.
But this was to be a short-lived dream. Such a drastic change could not be im-
posed on the institutions of Sri Lankan political and social life for long without a major
reaction. Despite the economic success, political opposition widened and produced an
escalating wave of repression and, after a series of yet-to-be-solved murders of key
political opponents of the President, he was himself assassinated in 1993. Elections in
1994 saw the Peoples’ Alliance (led by the SLFP) come to power, pledging an end to
the war and a negotiated peace with the separatist LTTE, committed to clean, transpar-
ent and democratic governance, and advocating pro-poor economic policies. In the light
of subsequent events, it is particularly noteworthy that it had also adopted a strong anti-
privatisation stance. It did not take long for the new government to do a complete 'volte
face'.
2.3 The Peoples’ Alliance
The PA government – a coalition including remnants of the traditional left par-
ties -- was expected to place a break on the liberalisation process, if not indeed to re-
verse it. Instead, it rapidly committed itself to the reform agenda, working closely with
the Bank and the IMF. Even the few consumer subsidies, introduced in the early days
of the government, were subsequently largely withdrawn. In the political sphere, it may
even have outdone its predecessor in election-rigging and in political corruption. And it
has become clear that the pro-war lobby has been powerful enough to ensure no con-
cessions are made that could lead to negotiations for peace. There has been a seemingly
irresistible downward slide on political, economic and social criteria that has led to a
chronic and protracted crisis.
But why has a PA government, that raised such euphoric expectations when it
came to power, changed its policies so rapidly and so sharply to the extent that it has
become virtually indistinguishable from its predecessors in its political conduct? Why
has the country reached such an impasse after almost a quarter a century of economic10
reforms that have won praise from international institutions for "good macroeconomic
management and progress in trade liberalization, privatization, and financial sector
reform"
4 and that have made Sri Lanka the most open market-oriented economy in
South Asia. In the next section, we try to conceptualise this process, drawing on recent
theoretical developments and the experience of other countries.
3. CONCEPTUALISATION
Any analysis of the political responses to a liberalisation package has to appre-
ciate that it involves profound distributional changes. Even if it does lead to faster
growth and to higher average incomes, the gains will be distributed unequally, often
with a significant number of losers, especially in the short-term. Indeed, we have ar-
gued elsewhere that it may not just be actual gains or losses that are important, but
perceived changes in relative inequality and in possible future opportunities (Dunham
& Jayasuriya 2000). The latter we considered to be particularly important in explaining
increased social tension. Policy and institutional reforms can have a profound effect on
the underlying determinants of asset returns (by revaluing skills and other human capi-
tal, revaluing the social capital embodied in ethnic, religious and other networks, and
revaluing physical capital) so that the perceived net wealth of the household or of indi-
viduals is redefined. Actual or potential distributional changes can then prove a potent
source of social and political conflict along already existing (class, ethnic, religious or
regional) ‘fault lines’ in the society. This is particularly likely to occur when reforms
fail to generate a large or rapid expansion of the total economic pie.
However, the social impact of policy reforms is by no means confined to these
impacts on income, wealth and perceived inequalities. They also generate new oppor-
tunities for rent extraction -- through discriminatory use of the policy process and
through the favoured use of political power and regulatory institutions. We argue below
that they can increase the scale of the potential gains from rent-seeking quite dramati-
cally, though the extent to which they can be appropriated obviously depends on speci-
ficities of the particular political and social environment.
It is important in this respect to note that the reform agenda itself has undergone
significant change. In the late 1970s, emphasis was placed on the implementation of
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specific pro-market policies -- in particular trade liberalisation and complementary
changes to the exchange rate regime. The initial reformers were very much innovators:
lessons of the Thatcher and Reagan years were yet to come, neo-liberalism and eco-
nomic reform were new and they were also politically contentious. Unless a govern-
ment had crushed the opposition (as had been the case in Chile), it could ill-afford to
run ahead of its political constituency and it had often to deliver quick and tangible
benefits to maintain popular support. But as time went on, and more particularly after
the demise of the USSR in 1991, the content of a reform programme changed to mean a
fundamental transformation involving a drastic overhaul of property rights and deregu-
lation of the whole economy.
5 By the early 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union and
the adoption of pro-market policies in China, a visible socialist alternative had effec-
tively ceased to exist. And, with widespread acceptance of the neo-liberal agenda, the
political context in which reformers operated became distinctly different. Liberalisation
had become mainstream and governments were no longer faced with viable policy
alternatives. Willingness to acquiesce and embark on a liberalisation programme se-
cured the blessing of international financial institutions and offered the prospect of
possibly significant rewards in terms of large-scale foreign capital inflows and foreign
aid. Resistance, in contrast, no longer appeared to offer any tangible benefits. Market
liberalisation was increasingly accepted throughout the political spectrum as essential
for promoting growth.
It was also seen as significantly undermining conditions under which corruption
could flourish. Though they were by no means the only source, literature on rent-
seeking behaviour (beginning with Tullock and Kreuger) gave the impression that rent-
extraction was firmly rooted in state controls. And it created the assumption that liber-
alisation and deregulation – when they had eventually been achieved -- would lead,
almost as a matter of course, to its elimination.
6 In practice, of course, complete liber-
alisation and deregulation never occur overnight. They are staggered over time. And,
since the process normally takes place in fits and starts, theorists might argue that rent-
                                                
5  It did not involve trade and exchange rate liberalisation so much as the dismantling of state controls
over domestic and international trade, the freeing of capital flows and financial markets, and the drastic
reduction of state ownership, including areas such as basic public utilities, traditionally considered the
natural domain of the public sector.
6 See, for example, papers in Elliot (1997). Robinson(1998), reviewing the failure of most anti-corruption
measures in developing economies goes so far as to speculate that “….it may be that privatisation offers
the only viable prospect of curtailing corruption in the third world" (p.158).12
seeking activity cannot be ruled out when market institutions are still imperfect or
completely absent.
7 Nevertheless, by-and-large, the assumption of neo-liberal thinking
was (and is) that liberalisation (when it has been carried out) would solve the perennial
problem of rent-seeking behaviour.
But is that realistic? We would argue that, quite the contrary, a staggered reform
programme aimed at a complete transformation of state-dominated economies, can
open up (and subsequently entrench) rent-seeking opportunities on an hitherto unprece-
dented scale. Rolling-back the state may be the ultimate objective, but during the tran-
sition period it is the state that controls the pace and sequencing of the liberalisation
process, and those who control or who can influence the state can find themselves in a
highly privileged and fortuitous position. The state decides which sectors are liberalised
(and in what sequence), which activities are privatised, how tendering will be dealt
with, what will be the terms of any eventual sale to the private sector, and what it will
face in future via competition policy (see Stewart 2000: 248). With privatisation, it is
possible for the first time to sell off valuable state assets (most notably public utilities
such as telecommunications, energy and transport) as a core component of a govern-
ment economic policy programme. Arguably, the short-term stock of rents that can be
extracted by a few individuals from privatisation far exceed those from nationalisation
(even if the latter produced a flow of benefits over a much longer period). And, as
many of the buyers are likely to be foreigners, the opportunity for corrupt transfers of
funds to safe overseas locations provides an added attraction. The extent to which this
actually takes place will obviously vary, being always in part conditioned by the politi-
cal context, but the potential is nevertheless there.
8
For the private sector, economic liberalisation means that the potential rewards
for investment are also correspondingly larger. Domestic and foreign entrepreneurs are
willing to pay more for the opportunities that are offered than in the pre-reform era.
Liberalisation of foreign investment is a central part of the reform agenda and, not sur-
prisingly,  FDI  inflows can increase long  before a complete  set of policy reforms have
                                                
7 See, for example, Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny (1992)
8 The conventional view that liberalisation generates growth and eases competitive pressures (by in-
creasing the size of the economic pie), and that it reduces gains that can be made from discretionary use
of state power (is no longer adequate in the face of experiences in former Soviet bloc countries and
elsewhere. For a discussion of issues related to the links between liberalisation and corruption, see
Rodrik (1994) and Elliot (1997).13
been implemented, anticipating higher profitability in the future. Selective application
and manipulation of trade and investment liberalisation is thus a powerful weapon that
can be used to political and personal advantage. And, as with privatisation, the conduit
role of the state (and of its leading figures) does not disappear. Most FDI has to be
formally approved, designated sectors can obtain extra assistance, while others can find
themselves faced with regulatory barriers (national security, environmental protection,
cultural objections etc.). It is not surprising, therefore, that in many countries those in
charge of dismantling control regimes and the privatisation of state assets have found
new and greater opportunities for nepotism and for lucrative rent extraction.
How much of a problem this poses to the implementation of economic reforms
is partly an empirical question and it is a matter of considerable debate. As we have
noted, many supporters of liberalisation consider corruption in the course of reform to
be a transitory phenomenon -- a cost society has to bear until it has an efficient market
economy. They believe that liberalisation will "reduce the opportunities for corruption
in the long-run" (Tanzi 1997:168). But such a fortuitous outcome is in no sense inevita-
ble. As we have seen, it can also provide additional resources for existing structures of
patronage, and create new structures whose interests are in no sense compatible with a
liberal economy that eliminates rent extraction. The liberalisation process then becomes
'distorted': it produces outcomes that not only diverge from the ideal assured by its
proponents but entrenches a system that ensures smooth and unabated rent extraction.
In other words, the liberalisation process becomes 'path-dependent', with outcomes
diverging more and more from what may be economically ‘efficient’.
The danger then is that, as the stakes get higher, political power is sought for the
control it gives over the distribution of a potentially rapidly expanding pot of economic
resources (Stewart 2000). Holding on to power becomes a matter of fundamental im-
portance, both because of the largesse and influence it yields and because of the much
greater economic and political cost of being marginalised as losers. As a result, incum-
bents become more willing to subvert political institutions, processes and movements
that threaten their grip on power. Public scrutiny and dissent is suppressed, activities of
political opponents and their supporters are undermined and democratic freedoms are
eroded. Contenders for power often find group cohesion, and the ethnic or class differ-
ences that can spark it off, a powerful mobilising force in the competition for resources
(Samarasinghe & Coughlan 1991; Stewart 2000.); there is less concern with transpar-14
ency, and perceptions of inequality and social exclusion begin to mount. When com-
bined with the redefinition of asset values and related changes in wealth and incomes,
this can become a recipe for acute social and political conflict, as disgruntled social
groups provide bases of political support for those posing as defenders of transparency
and a wider ‘public’ interest.
But, then, what determines whether a country proceeds on a ‘golden’ path of
steady growth and development or gets locked into a downward spiraling ‘destructive’
path? Why did Sri Lanka decay?
4. RE-INTERPRETATION
The nature of the Jayawardene regime's early policy package was described in
some detail earlier to show that it was far broader in scope than is often appreciated,
and conditioned by history, ideology and institutions. The specific components of the
package were such that the outcome was bound to aggravate social and ethnic tensions
in a country that already had deep historically-evolved fault lines. As the initial eco-
nomic stimulus of the PSIP waned, discontent widened but found traditional avenues of
protest and political action blocked by a regime that had become assertively and arro-
gantly authoritarian. The particular combination of massive foreign aid, economic re-
forms, and large-scale military expenditures provided new and lucrative sources of
corruption. Politicians and the bureaucrats administering projects began to benefit sig-
nificantly, and the payment of unofficial 'commissions' became increasingly the norm
as corruption was institutionalised. In the 1980s, when funds to 'lead projects' dried up,
the scope for large-scale corruption of this nature was reduced, only to be revived with
privatisation in the early 1990s which saw very little transparency (on this see Dunham
& Kelegama 1997). And as protest and opposition to the regime spilled over into extra-
parliamentary action and was met by repression and by more authoritarianism, the
scope for corruption was even further enhanced.
The escalation of military expenditures from the mid-1980s introduced another
dimension to the corruption and patronage. It had two principal strands. Large-scale
military purchases from abroad provided opportunities for brokerage, yielding signifi-
cant commissions for military personnel and the politically-favoured civilians who
became involved. And, domestically, the expansion of the military and security-related
activities presented opportunities in tendering and the state purchase of goods and15
services. The security situation was also one in which there was enormous scope for
forms of corruption such as blackmail -- exploiting vulnerable figures against whom
accusations of having sympathies or contacts with the Tamil Tigers (or indeed just
being a security risk) could be relatively easily contrived. The latter was a development
made all the more viable by the general erosion of state protection and civil rights.
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It is in this context that we can begin to understand the rapid shift in policy by
the PA government towards privatisation. Not only did it reverse its stand, it surpassed
efforts of the previous regime by fully or partially privatising a range of enterprises
including the national airline, telecommunications, plantations and ports. As described
in the previous section, privatisation of state assets could provide rents on a scale that
far surpassed what could ever be obtained from the import protection of selected sec-
tors. And rent-seeking could be taken still further. Regulatory powers that controlled
the competition in a particular market could be used as a source of yet more additional
funds  -- on top of rents extracted in the privatisation exercise itself. Given these power-
ful incentives, it is unsurprising that the new government not only reneged on an ex-
plicit promise not to privatise the telecommunications industry, but shifted its regula-
tory stance to one that restricted competitive pressures on the newly privatised entity
(Jayasuriya & Knight 2001).
Furthermore, the interests of the politicians who were in a position to extract
continuing rents from the privatisation exercise coincided with those of others who
could extract them from the other major continuing source, the country's civil war.
Shared economic incentives converged in shared political interests. And, for both, con-
tinued access to political power was essential to maintain these lucrative sources of
massive wealth. This created the economic basis for a coalition within the government's
ranks (with some outside participants) to stifle any initiative to establish more transpar-
ency in government purchases, contracts and other commercial dealings. And this
wealth became a major source of finance for the maintenance of patron-client relations
that continue to provide the bases of political power and influence throughout the
country. The state enterprise sector has shrunk, as have the opportunities for exploiting
the state  apparatus to dispense employment and other benefits (though they have by no
                                                
9 The fact that there are now some 30,000 deserters from the armed forces are considered an important
contributory factor for the upsurge in violent crime (The Sunday Times, Colombo, 24 December 2000).16
means been eliminated). But the problem has been circumvented to a considerable
degree by the massive expansion of ministerial posts and privileges (ballooned by coa-
lition politics) and, more generally, by the now-extensive privileges of all politicians.
The process has also been facilitated by World Bank initiatives for the decentralisation
of government finances which enables politicians to access substantial funds to buttress
their patron-client networks at local level. In combination, these processes have en-
trenched a system of political corruption that subverts political democracy and judicial
independence. They also create incentives for others to establish organisations and
forms of activity that can challenge them: teams and individuals excluded from the
game by adjustments to the rules seek new games and new rules!
And yet, for all the similarities, there are also several significant differences
between a regime that is a weak coalition of groups and a powerful centralised author-
ity -- particularly the de facto dictatorship of Premadasa. First, the corruption no longer
seems to be centralised. The weakness of central authority has been reflected in a ‘de-
mocratisation’ of corruption and a plurality of centres of influence-peddling. The gov-
ernment, lacking an effective parliamentary majority, depends on minor parties and
individuals to remain in power and it cannot afford to alienate groups and break the
coalition. Secondly, the situation is particularly fluid because the strong ideological
differences that existed up to the 1980s have now disappeared. This enables politicians
to switch allegiances with much greater alacrity than was the case in the past. It main-
tains a perception that the government's hold on power is always rather fragile,
strengthens patronage politics and in many ways legitimises rent-seeking behaviour,
while widening competition for rents.
In terms of the theoretical models of corruption, the current regime in Sri Lanka
possesses elements of two behavioural types. First, as Shleifer and Vishny (1993) point
out (and as mentioned in many private discussions in Sri Lankan business circles), the
economic outcome of decentralised corruption is greater economic inefficiency. Each
corrupt politician, bureaucrat or military officer acts with no regard for the impact of
his or her rent extraction on other people, and economic agents face higher costs be-
cause they are forced to pay a bribe but cannot be sure that they will not have also to
pay others. Second, economic efficiency is lower with a ‘roving bandit’ than with a
‘stationary bandit’. A stationary bandit expects to share in any future wealth that is
generated by the community and is therefore loathe to ‘kill the goose that lays the17
golden egg’. A roving bandit has no such expectations and maximises the loot that can
be extracted in the short-run.
Clearly, those in opposition during the UNP period who experienced the politi-
cal muscle of the increased funding and largesse that had come with liberalisation
learned their lesson well.  But, as described earlier, the differences between a weak
coalition and a powerful, centralised government (particularly that of Premadasa) affect
its rent-seeking behaviour in important ways. First, compared with the Premadasa re-
gime, there is a 'democratisation' of corruption. Second, the fragility of its grasp on
power makes its behaviour closer to a roving bandit than to a stationary bandit model.
Politicians are aware (even as they strive to maintain their hold on power) that they
might not be around to capture potentially larger future rents from a growing economy -
- gains that could only be obtained by sacrificing current rents. As the planning horizon
shortens, incentives to implement longer-term growth-oriented policies are lowered.
Thus we seem to have a regime that corresponds to a theoretical model of 'a plurality of
roving bandits'. This combination of the features of both theoretical models leads to the
same efficiency conclusion: a band of many roving bandits provides a worst case sce-
nario.
So what is the scenario for the future? We have so far ignored two key agents,
namely the country's business community and the wider public. Nearly a quarter cen-
tury after the initiation of liberalisation, the business community has expanded signifi-
cantly, exploiting opportunities presented by the more liberal economic framework,
however much it was distorted by the political programmes of governments. It appears
to be ready to exert itself more directly in the political arena as shown by its first inde-
pendent foray into the political sphere to lobby for a negotiated peace to the ethnic
conflict. Clearly it has a strong interest in the political process, given that a slide into
political and economic chaos threatens its basic interests. Second, the wider Sri Lankan
community has a long tradition of struggle to defend both its vital economic interests
and broader democratic and civil rights. The longer-term scenario for Sri Lanka will
depend heavily on the nature and extent of the intervention of these agents in the politi-
cal arena in the coming months and years.18
5. CONCLUSIONS
The global movement to liberalise economies has not always produced the
beneficial results that were expected of it. Indeed, in some cases it has led to economic
recession, political chaos and social disintegration. So why has this happened? The
voluminous literature that exists on Sri Lanka's economic policy reforms since the late
1970s assumes, almost as a matter of course, that they had nothing whatsoever to do
with the subsequent socio-political decay. If anything, it is the latter that is seen to have
held back the beneficial effects that would otherwise have occurred.
While much has been achieved by opening up the economy, stimulating entre-
preneurial activity and promoting export growth, we have argued that the liberalisation
process has also to be seen as a major explanatory factor in the socio-political down-
turn, reflecting specific characteristics of the Sri Lankan social, institutional and politi-
cal setting, the enormous potential gains that the transition offered, and the particular
way in which individual reforms were designed and implemented. The Sri Lankan
setting has been moulded by a long history of patronage, and by a strong religious-
ethnic and class divide as organising principles. We view the policy package as having
been the outcome of conscious political (rather than purely economic) choices geared to
strengthening patronage networks and buttressing political support. Over a period of
some two decades, a package that included economic policy liberalisation (but also the
PSIP, a new constitution with the executive presidency, and deliberate attack on the
checks and balances of a democratic society) set the country on a path of socio-political
decay. Once on this path, economic reforms often produced outcomes that were unex-
pected and undesirable, and which served to accelerate and to reinforce the steady
downward spiral. Given the important similarities in social and political institutions,
what has occurred can perhaps in some ways be seen as a South Asian phenomenon,
with implications for further the future trajectories of countries such as India that are
undertaking liberalisation.
Douglas North (1996:353) concluded in his Nobel lecture that: "..transferring
the formal political and economic rules of successful Western economies to Third
World or Eastern European economies is not a sufficient condition for good economic
performance. Privatization is not a panacea for poor economic performance". We
would go further in the light of Sri Lankan experience. Not only are they insufficient to
ensure good economic performance but, in specific settings, they may produce little19
short of social and economic disaster. The Sri Lankan experience confirms that far
more is needed than purely technocratic policy solutions. Reform programmes -- if they
are to have broad-based success -- should not only address fundamental economic is-
sues but should also be tailored to ‘fit’ specific institutional settings. And, when major
class, ethnic or religious fault lines exist in society, the reform process needs to be very
carefully managed. Policies have to be sensitive to multi-faceted distributional issues,
account must be taken of the predictable responses of different actors, and trade-offs
have to be made to maintain social cohesiveness. But for this to become a sustainable
reality there must be legal and political institutions with adequate checks and balances
to protect democratic freedoms. The revival of the economy and the reinvigoration of
society both require an immediate political response. The rapid abolition of the execu-
tive presidency seems a first essential step on what will be a long and difficult journey
if Sri Lanka is to achieve a prosperous economy with social harmony and a vibrant
democracy.
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